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Overview of Media Development In post Taliban Afghanistan

Overview of Media Development In post Taliban Afghanistan
By: Aziz Hakimi
Former director of the Killid Group

Seven years after the overthrow of the Taliban government by U.S. military forces, Afghanistan still remains a country mired in armed conflict. It is in danger of once again becoming a failed state, that is incapable of effectively controlling its territory or protecting its citizens or providing basic services to one of the poorest peoples of the world. The increasing level of violence in the countryside and the near complete encirclement of the capital has completely destroyed the illusion of Afghanistan on its way to peace and prosperity. The situation has reached a tipping point. This year in particular, the security situation has deteriorated very rapidly. The insurgency is gaining strength and much of the country is now inaccessible to the Afghan government and humanitarian and development NGOs. There is a widespread recognition that the current military strategy has failed. Despite promises of more troops to battle the increasingly confident Taliban, the opportunity to turn the situation around might already have been last. The insurgents have shown little inclination to engage in political negotiations, despite repeated calls for negotiations from the Afghan government. Sections of the international community have also supported calls for negotiating with the Taliban. In the midst of an election year in the US and in anticipation of next year’s election in Afghanistan, there is a growing desire to stabilise the situation in order to achieve electoral gains. The Afghan state is dependent on the outside world for virtually everything, including money, troops and most importantly legitimacy. As elsewhere, legitimacy is derived by a state’s ability to protect its citizens and provide basic services. The overdependence of the Afghan state on the outside and the over-intrusiveness of the external forces in the process will have serious long term implications for Afghanistan.

The war will not be won militarily. Instead, working towards a political solution, strengthening democratic institutions and speeding up development are surer ways to end fighting and head towards peace. This outcome is attainable through a process of deeper dialogue among Afghans themselves and their international allies. Providing a new vision and direction to the country requires an independent and professional mass media and the commitment and engagement of civil society actors. Afghanistan’s democracy is extremely fragile and freedom of expression and media development are fundamental to the democratic process. The country is in a transition from three decades of war to a new democratic order in which the development of the independent media – which still faces major challenges – is vital. Afghans have little faith in their own government and its rule of law institutions, which are often a source of abuse rather than protection. The overall human rights deficit and widespread violations of international humanitarian law in Afghanistan, especially the protection of civilians in the context of ongoing conflict, the widespread impunity that perpetrators enjoy and the absence of justice are issues of major concern to Afghans. The one-time popularly elected government of Hamid Karzai is becoming increasingly repressive. In the initial years after the overthrow of the Taliban, the major threat to rule of law was warlords in and outside the government.

Today, the major source of concern to Afghans is their own elected government, led by the charismatic Hamid Karzai. The deteriorating state of freedom of expression and legal and extra-judicial threats to journalists is one clear example of how this internationally backed government is failing in its basic obligations to the people of Afghanistan. Greater pressure must be exerted on the Afghan government to respect its national and international legal obligations to protect freedom of expression. For journalist and media professionals, the growing violence targeting them and threats to freedom of expression and independence of media is particularly worrying. Any discussion of the state of independent media in Afghanistan should be seen in the context of this changing landscape. Freedom of expression and Afghan journalists are under attack from all sides. The conflict has changed so dramatically that a number of journalists and human rights activists have called upon the Afghan government and international community to formally recognise the application of international humanitarian law to the situation in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is clearly in the grip of a bloody conflict. The disregard for civilian lives and the violation of the laws necessitates this action.

The independent media is not just an isolated success story in post-Taliban Afghanistan. Although it has not yet been conclusively proven, requiring dedicated research, there is a common agreement among all stake holders that independent media has been the main contributor to all other achievements in the post-Taliban Afghanistan. Under the Taliban there was only one radio broadcaster, Radio Shariat1 run by Radio Television Afghanistan (RTA), the national television and radio authority. Today, there are more than a dozen private television networks2 and more than 50 independent radio stations, including in the remote rural areas of the country. There are several hundred magazines and newspapers registered at the Ministry of Information and Culture, but only a small fraction of them publish regularly because of high costs, poor advertising revenue and lack of a reading culture. Historically, the Afghan press has always been the domain of the state. The few private newspapers allowed by some regimes were frequently censored by the authorities. There was no private broadcaster in Afghanistan before 2001. In the last seven years, Afghanistan has seen a remarkable growth in its media sector. Although still facing major challenges, the Afghan media scene today reflects maturity, strength, diversity and professionalism. It is a shining example of sound Afghan and international partnership that is leading the way in transforming Afghanistan for the better for its own citizens and for the world at large. One of the most noticeable impacts of the media development effort is in the availability of a good number of independent media outlets, products of relatively good quality, trainers, managers and professional journalists and their associations.

The real growth and progress that we are witnessing today primarily took place in the independent and commercial media sector. The much talked about transformation of the state-run media proceeds very slowly, if at all. Despite favourable official statements and continuous international interventions since early 2002, the reforms have not been fully implemented. With no real sign of change and commitment to properly pursuing the project, the process is adding to the frustration of the international donor agencies and Afghans who would like to see RTA become a genuine Public Service Broadcaster (PSB).

With the departure early this year of RTA Director Najib Roshan, whatever hope there was for reform might have ended. The current minister of Culture and Youth Affairs seems determined to keep the state-run broadcaster in the tight grip of the government. Seven years in the making, today the independent media faces many challenges. An all-powerful government and a complying parliament have jointly adopted restrictive laws that are undermining the independent character of media.

With security deteriorating and under mounting pressure because of indecisive battles with the Taliban, the government has resorted to scapegoat the media more than once. It blamed the media for emboldening the Taliban and demoralizing the people by reporting, which it claimed showed Taliban gains and downplayed government strength and “successes”. The results have been greater restrictions on the media. The government’s moves, supported by powerful elements in parliament were aimed at removing clauses that sought to support the independence of the media from the draft Mass Media Law. The Mass Media Law which was rejected by president Karzai in December 2007 was recently passed by parliament. Although the new media law recognises Radio Television Afghanistan as a public service broadcaster, the state still treats it as its propaganda mouth piece. Legal protection and continued government support are essential for the development and growth of the independent media and reform of state-run media. The media must also make maximum use of existing opportunities to justify its utility as well as to enhance its capacity in order to minimize the risks of being victimized in the changing political circumstances. Only then would it possible for the media to confront issues of sustainability emanating from a lack of funding, competition and market dynamics.

Today, international donors have stopped direct funding of media projects and it is unlikely that most print and broadcast media will be able to survive the funding cuts. There may be some exceptions, however, but the reality remains unchanged – the limited economic development has yet to support growth of an advertising culture. Generally, advertisers prefer entertainment programs on TV and radio. The print media, with limited capacity to “entertain”, either gets very little or no advertisements. Advertisers also prefer media outlets with large audiences. These would typically be dominated by entertainment programs — music, movies and soap operas or have been changing towards having more entertainment and less space for educational, cultural and sensitive but important social issues. The result has been the building of profitable businesses amidst ignorance and apathy. Advertisers also prefer media with large circulations. In terms of the print media only a few weekly publications are able to meet their standards. Afghanistan does not have a daily national newspaper. It has a delivery and distribution agency, which has been assisting media to raise circulation and promote a reading habit. But the efforts to raise circulation have not translated into advertising growth. Afghanistan has a handful of private commercial television and radio stations but their programming is aimed largely at urban audiences – and is often dominated by entertainment. They thus do not only ignore the information needs of the large rural population, but the opulent lifestyles portrayed in their programs could also be contributing to the increasing alienation of the rural population.

Overall, the lack of donor funding, small advertising market, low professionalism of journalists, poor content quality, limited outreach and distribution and a largely illiterate population remain the major obstacles the independent media has to overcome in order to fulfil its constitutional responsibility to serve the public interest. These factors – individually and collectively – have prevented the independent media from adequately performing the classical “watch dog” function. This has resulted in failure to expose and challenge corrupt and abusive systems and authorities; compromise in the quality of content and dissemination of information, including information on the developmental processes; all of which threaten to hinder the ability of media to assist the transition by promoting social cohesion and shaping public opinion and discourse for peace and development.

Despite problems, the independent media remains a rare success story in post-Taliban Afghanistan. It has been a development that has been welcomed by the Afghan people. The Afghan media is diverse but unifying and has potential for further growth and added influence in the changes taking place in the country. The new challenges facing Afghanistan today threaten to undo the substantial progress made by media and civil society since 2002. The shift in donor attention from independent media and civil society to psychological operations (military propaganda), quick-fix development interventions or outright warfare have undermined the contributions these two institutions have made and could make in the country’s transition.

Sustainable development will not be possible without Afghan media and civil society playing an active role to facilitate constructive dialogue. Many of the most successful and trusted Afghan media institutions face the threat of closure or of being overtaken by partisan interests. Confronted with these challenges, the media and civil society groups have started to come together to redirect government and donor attention on the role media and civil society can play to facilitate a peaceful transformation and sustainable development in the country.

Any threat to the future of independent media will have widespread and long term repercussions on all the other areas of progress in Afghanistan, threatening the future of democracy and development in the country. Alarmed by the current situation the Afghan media and civil society family has named freedom of expression and protection of journalists as a key human rights priority area needing urgent attention. It is becoming much more dangerous to speak out, especially in the provinces where government institutions are weak, the insurgents are gaining strength and international forces have a nominal presence.

In the context of this overall deterioration of security, journalists are finding it increasingly difficult to operate as independent and non-partisan actors, collecting and transmitting information to an increasingly beleaguered public. Afghan journalists are facing increasing pressure, harassment and intimidation from all sides: insurgents, Afghan security forces, international military forces, local and regional strong men, state institutions represented by parliament and ministry of information and culture and conservative elements within state and society.

Media reports critical of government result in intimidation and harassment and at times informational black out. Similarly, reports critical of the Taliban are seen to be supporting the government positions and result in harassment, intimidation and some times in loss of life. The abduction and subsequent killing of Ajmal Naqshbandi and the murder at her home of Zakia Zaki, a woman who directed Radio Sulh or Peace Radio is a sober reminder of how dangerous it is for Afghan journalists to simply do their job. Kamran Mirhazar, a journalist working for US media NGO Internews was imprisoned by the Afghan secret police because of his anti-government reporting. On his release he received death threats from the Taliban who accused him of anti-Taliban reporting. He now lives outside the country. This example clearly illustrates how Afghan journalists are increasingly finding themselves caught up between opposing parties in the conflict.

Others have literally found themselves on death row because of a simple act of downloading an article from the internet reportedly critical of women’s treatment in Islam. Sayed Perwaiz Kambakhsh, 23, was arrested in 2007 and tried by a lower court in the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif. He spent many months in jail in Kabul waiting to have his death sentence overturned. After a number of hearings, on October 21, 2008, Kambakhsh’s life sentence was reduced to 20 years in prison. The western-supported Afghan government of Hamid Karzai showed little inclination to come to ensure due process during his trial. The banning by Afghan law makers of Indian entertainment programmes broadcasted on private TV channels has deeply divided many Afghans. Some Afghans see these programmes as corrupting Afghan society while others view restricting moves by conservatives as ‘re-Talibanisation’ of Afghanistan and an attack on freedom of expression and independent media. The face of Afghan media is also changing rapidly.

Almost all of the so called independent media outlets that emerged after the fall of the Taliban in late 2001 were assisted by various international donor agencies, chiefly the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the European Commission (EC). Following presidential and parliamentary elections in 2004 and 2005, donor assistance to independent media largely ceased. The lack of a real economic growth and poor advertising market compounded the problem. This sudden drying out of ‘neutral’ funding and the failure of the advertising sector to take over has seriously threatened the future of independent media in Afghanistan. The results were quite dramatic. The print sector suffered the most.  Many hundreds newspapers closed.

Today, Afghanistan still lacks a truly national newspaper, both in terms of content and reach.  Despite the challenge of funding, a small number of independent Radio and TV stations managed to withstand the change in donor policies, thanks to a small advertising market. But the future for these media outlets is still uncertain. The recent moves by parliament to ban foreign entertainment programmes, a major source of advertising income for these outlets, is a serious challenge to their growth and sustainability. Other media outlets made some undesirable compromises to survive. Acceptance of political funding resulted in compromise of editorial policy and loss of credibility. The co-opting of media by political parties and local strong men has undermined the credibility of independent media. Even more worrying is the marginalisation of small and under-resourced independent media outlets by more powerful ‘political’ and partisan media, directly funded by some of Afghanistan’s most powerful and doggy characters. The politicisation of media will have a very negative impact on Afghanistan’s ongoing transition.

There is a growing acceptable of the assumption that the Taliban propaganda is working and effective. To counter this growing trend and believing that the Afghan government is unable to win the propaganda war on its own, the international military forces active in the unstable areas of the country and their development agencies are spending large sums of money establishing radio stations and funding programming and public service announcements whose editorial contents are heavily controlled and openly anti-Taliban.  This has resulted in blurring the line between independent media and military sponsored media, undermining the work of the entire sector as well as directly putting the lives of Afghan journalists in danger.

An example of how such funding can pose serious dangers for those working for these stations and producing these programmes can be best illustrated by the example of a small US military funded radio station that broadcasts, as part of the military’s psychological operations or ‘psy-ops, into the Kamdesh district of Nuristan, along the Pakistan border – the target of a US counter-insurgency effort to defeat Taliban-led militants. The journalists working for the radio station are unable to move outside the district centre, for fear of being killed by the Taliban, who see the radio station as a propaganda tool of the US military. The international military forces and their governments must be made to recognise the unacceptable risks their media policies create for Afghan journalists in the midst of the current conflict. This situation is simply untenable and morally unacceptable. Similar to calls by humanitarian NGOs and the UN for ‘humanitarian space’ and de-politicisation and de-militarisation of humanitarian and development aid, the Afghan journalist and media community should make similar calls for neutral space and independent funding.

The channelling of international media development assistance through civilian-led development agencies with similar experiences in other countries emerging from conflicts, focus on creation of independent media outlets outside the state control instead of an exclusive focus on state-run media, editorial independence in return for funding and attempts to resist interference in content and distinction between media development activities and psychological operations and public diplomacy as opposed to media development efforts led by the military and defence contractors distinguishes international, but particular US media development efforts in Afghanistan from those in Iraq. The success of media development activities in Afghanistan and the failure of similar efforts in Iraq is the result of this distinction being properly articulated and put into practice. The role of the Afghan partners in this process also needs to be recognised. However, recent developments indicate that this distinction is being blurred in the foreign military forces’ attempt to win ‘hearts and minds’.

After the fall of the Taliban regime, the focus of foreign media development aid was on providing funds for “quick impact” projects aimed at addressing the short-term communication needs of the political transition and donor agencies. Seven years later, the same donors have cutback direct funding to the independent media and reform in the state-run broadcaster and information service has been hampered by an unwilling government which threatens not just the sustainability of the media but also continuity of the communication effort (and the resulting benefits).

Of the two main media development donors in Afghanistan, the USAID focused on the creation and support of new private media outlets outside the state control, while the EC’s focus saw its involvement in both the private media and is committed to the reforming of state-run radio and television into a public service broadcaster. Soon after the Afghan presidential elections [2005], both the European Commission and USAID dramatically reduced direct funding to the media. The cumulative EC-USAID budget for supporting the independent media was US$30 million between 2002 and 2006. Funding had been cut down to US$6 million for the period between 2007 and 2010 – a 80 percent reduction. A recent decision to establish new radio stations and upgrade existing stations resulted in allocation of additional US$ 5 million, bringing the total USAID funding to US$11 million. The European Commission’s strategy for Afghanistan 2007 to 2013 does not include direct funding to the media. As result there is a strong possibility that many of the media organizations that had been around to facilitate the transition with informed coverage in the local languages could collapse or be forced to seek support of powerful individuals and political parties and compromise their independence. Such a scenario can be averted through continuous 5-10 year3 – targeted and well-monitored – support to the media.

Continuing support to the media is justified by the public support it can help to build for the peace process, which a majority of Afghans want to see ending in lasting peace. The Afghan media remains as the last line of defence of public interest in a country that is still dominated by factionalism and violence. More so in a situation where civil society still remains confined to the capital and other cities that are deemed to be “safe”. Continued investment in the media is investment for peace and the growth of civil society.

In relative terms, the country’s media law remains one of the freest in the region that guarantees the right to free expression but still includes broad restriction on content deemed ‘‘contrary to the principles of Islam or offensive to other religions or sects’’, as well as ‘‘matters leading to dishonouring and defaming individuals’’. The government recently named a third limitation on the press: ‘‘the media must not undermine the democratic order’’.۴

Is donor Assistance Fading?

Since 2002, the United States Government has spent US$215 million in support of efforts to create a free and vibrant press in Iraq and Afghanistan. This high level of foreign assistance was tied to an overtly articulated U.S. government policy. The funding was meant to assist President George W. Bush’s policy of spreading democracy across the globe to counter terrorism.5 Among the five foundations that the president has named as being essential for all successful democracies, a ‘‘vibrant free press’’ that ‘‘informs the public, ensures transparency and prevents authoritarian backsliding’’ was one of them.  ‘‘It is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world’’.۶ Delivered in May 2005, this was a bold statement by the US president, but not entirely new. It was the culmination of a series of remarks he made about the spread of democracy after the September 11, 2001 attacks. In various speeches the president argued that in the wake of September 11, the ‘‘surest way for the United States to improve its own security was to spread democracy’’ abroad. The September 2002 National Security Strategy presents an elaborate US response to the September 11 attacks. The response is hinged upon spreading ‘‘democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world’’.

The United States invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 and the rolling out of the time-table for the Bonn mandated political transition opened the door for the US and its ‘‘war on terror’’ allies to re-draw the map of Afghan media. Over the next five years, US, European, Japanese, British, Canadian, Italian, German and Indian government agencies along side United Nations agencies and private foundations donated funds, equipment, training and technical expertise to prop up the state-run broadcaster, RTA, and create new independent and commercial media outlets. In lead up to the Emergency Loya Jirga (Grand Council in Pashto, made up of political, religious and tribal leaders7, designed as the highest traditional institution of national decision making) and to help get information out to the public on the latest political developments, the initial US media development efforts started with the capacity building of RTA but when this proved difficult, US State Department shifted strategy to focus exclusively on creating new independent media outlets8, including community radio stations9 and a highly successful news wire which in 2005 became fully Afghan.10 The purpose of the USAID funded Internews programme was to ‘‘enhance the Afghan media’s ability to gather information and report it in a ‘‘clear, balanced manner to the Afghan criticizes amid a sensitive political transition’’.۱۱

The European Commission followed a two-track policy. Stating its ‘‘overall aim of … intervention … to facilitate the growth of a vibrant civil society by nurturing dialogue, conflict resolution via discourse, and the spread of a plurality of ideas and opinions via the establishment of a variety of free and independent media outlets’’۱۲, it provided assistance to The Killid Group (TKG)13 and Good Morning Afghanistan (GMA)14, a two-hour daily broadcast on state-run broadcaster, while continuing to work with a consortium made of the BBC World Service Trust, Deutsche Welle, Deutsche Welle Akademie, and Canal France International to reform and restructure RTA. The consortium’s one-year work plan aims to pave the way for reform of RTA over a five-year period.15

Foreign donor funding may have assisted the emergence of an independent media sector in Afghanistan, however, the momentum could not have succeeded had it not been for the enthusiastic response of the Afghan civil society, commercial entrepreneurs and international media development organisations who took advantage of the press freedom in post-Taliban Afghanistan. David Rhode of the Harvard University’s Joan Shorenstein Centre on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, who in 2005 assessed the American efforts to build a free press in Iraq and Afghanistan believes that ‘‘overall, the American effort to develop an independent media in Afghanistan appears to have been more successful than the American effort in Iraq’’.۱۶

In terms of costs the success in Afghanistan has been achieved with a fraction of the money spent in Iraq. The US spent US$200 million on media development in Iraq with dismal results to show for, versus US$15 million in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan the US funding largely went to the development of the independent media sector, while in Iraq the US concentrated all its efforts in the reform of the state-run radio, television and newspaper, which Rhode called a ‘‘mistake’’ and a ‘‘near total failure’’.۱۷

Despite huge investment and continuing involvement of key donors such as the European Commission with RTA, the reform process aimed at transforming the national broadcaster from state-control to a genuine and effective Public Service Broadcaster (PSB) has been ineffective and the government does not seem ready to give up its right of exclusive control over the national broadcaster.

The American media development effort in Iraq was managed by the Department of Defence through a private contractor (Science Applications International Corporation - SAIC)18 with little experience in the area. Furthermore, media development efforts in Iraq were undertaken in the absence of proper laws and regulatory framework. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) issued law [Order 14, June 2003] meant to regulate media activities in Iraq, according to US government officials, was ‘‘designed to ensure Iraq’s stability’’, but critics say it ‘‘laid the groundwork for censorship’’. The laws had broad restrictions including ‘‘prohibiting media activities aimed at inciting violence, civil disorder, rioting or action against coalition forces’’. It also banned media from advocating ‘‘Bath parity’s return to power or the changing of Iraq’s borders by any means’’.۱۹

According to David Rhode, ‘‘a variety of factors handicapped the American media development efforts in Iraq: the de facto unilateral American invasion of Iraq, the Pentagon’s issuing of a single contract to an inexperienced [defence] contractor [with no previous media development experience], the Pentagon’s decision to focus on only reforming the state-run broadcaster and the CPA’s effort to influence Iraqi media network coverage, all contributed to an efforts that was a near complete failure in its first year’’.۲۰ In contrast to Iraq, the American media development effort in Afghanistan was handled by the State Department’s Office of Transition Initiative (OTI), which apparently developed relatively effective strategies for helping independent media develop in Afghanistan.21 This may be true, but reforming laws and regulatory frameworks safeguarding a free press were left out of OTI’s initial strategy. The issue of ownership of community radio stations also needs to be clarified. Internews which helped set up these stations retains ownership of equipments donated to these stations.

With such a high investment in the media sector, donors and recipients have realised that unless there is reform of Afghanistan’s arbitrary legal and regulatory framework, their investment might be threatened in the long-term. Efforts to reform the country’s Mass Media Law are ongoing. The law in the form of an approved decree by cabinet has been reviewed and commented on by the Lower House of Parliament. It has been sent to the Upper House for approval after which it will be sent to President Hamid Karzai for signature, at which point it will become law.

The State Department involvement in media development in Afghanistan had another key benefit. Unlike Iraq, where the occupying CPA influenced media content of the Iraqi state-run broadcaster and newspaper, the State Department funding was free of any editorial control. However, there are reports of US government departments and agencies sometimes viewing media outlets that received US funding as vehicles for ‘‘information operations and public persuasion’’.۲۲ Soloway and Abubakar make a highly relevant point when they say that ‘‘if the goal of media development is to help local media partners evolve into genuinely independent news organisations, US representatives should not simultaneously encourage outlets to rely on military information products or [US] embassy-sponsored campaigns. Media development and public persuasion are distinct, important endeavours that need to be kept separate to be effective. Blurring the distinction has proven counter productive in other countries and will only undermine the objective of both’’.۲۳

The foreign media development funding may have created new independent and commercial media outlets in Afghanistan, but the effort to ensure the sustainability and self-sufficiency of these outlets have not fully succeeded. Although sustainability of media projects is a shared goal of donors and media organizations, the media is still far from reaching that ideal. Since 2002 when international assistance started pouring into the media sector, there has been little or no coordination between donors and implementing agencies for supporting media projects for lack of a commonly agreed strategy. Unlike Iraq where the US provided all of the media development funding to the state-run media organisation, the media development funding in Afghanistan came from multiple donors and were given to diverse groups. However, few authentic and committed Afghan entities received media development funding. And not long enough.

The issue of lack of proper ownership and leadership in the Afghan media development effort is an important reason named by those who believe that most of the international media development investment that went to foreign media organisations such as Internews to set up community radio stations and Aïna to train journalists might have been better utilised had it been given to authentic and committed media organisation run by Afghan managers. The ownership of most of the community radio stations set up by Internews is a cause for concern and the future sustainability of these radios is in serious doubt. Efforts to train Afghan journalists are also being criticised. Editors and media professional believe that journalism training were too short term, too basic, of doubtful quality and often neglecting the realities Afghan journalists faced on the ground.

Despite these observations and concerns, the Internews network community radio stations, The Killid Group, the Pajhwok Afghan News agency, the Centre for International Journalism, the Good Morning Afghanistan programme and the Radio Arman and Tolo TV project are all noticeable achievements of the international media development effort and a good demonstration of the Afghan media’s maturity and capacity. According to Rhode, ‘‘better security, a more stable government, a broad United Nations mandate, a variety of international donors, and focusing on privately owned outlets came together to produce better results in Afghanistan’’.۲۴ Although security has gravely deteriorated over the past five years, a fact that is becoming a major concern for journalists and media organisations, Rhode’s overall assessment of the international media development activities in Afghanistan can be described as being ‘‘fairly sound’’.

However, media development funding cuts since 2005, exacerbated by the country’s poor economic growth and advertising spending and the government’s attempt to water down media laws and regulatory framework is putting at risk the substantial international and Afghan investment in the development of Afghanistan’s media. Recent attempts by the foreign military forces to set up military aided media outlets and use independent Afghan media outlets for information operations, including products of public affairs and psychological operations to ‘wine hearts and minds’ is putting aid recipients and journalists working for them at great risk. But most importantly these efforts may compromise the role of the entire independent media sector in a country where there is suspicion of the US intentions and confusion about the role of military, intelligence and development agencies.

The Media Law

In February 2002, President Hamid Karzai gave his approval to a new Press Law that was drawn up by the Ministry of Information and Culture, based on a 1964 press law. The law was passed as a decree without public comment or consultation to which journalists, international press freedom watchdog groups, and the media development community strongly objected. The law aimed at controlling the media through licensing and content restrictions.25 It was less about protecting the media. It had broad restriction on content deemed ‘‘contrary to the principles of Islam or offensive to other religions or sects’’, as well as ‘‘matters leading to dishonouring and defaming individuals’’. But it also served to end the government’s media monopoly enabling non-state actors to publish newspapers and magazines or to set up radio or television stations.

In June 2002, the Ministry of Information and Culture issued a position paper, Reconstruction and Development of Media in Afghanistan, which laid the groundwork for the future development of the Afghan media. The government’s commitment to a free media was spelt out in this paper which stated that “anyone will be able to publish newspapers and periodicals without having to obtain a license”. A similarly ‘free’ policy was to apply to those wanting to set up television or radio networks, ensuring that they “will be protected against political interference”.۲۶ The paper also said that “the media must become an essential instrument in making the government transparent and accountable, and in generating national debate on the crucial decisions which we will have to make in the rebuilding of our country.”۲۷ The document also committed the interim government to transform Radio-Television Afghanistan and Bakhtar Information Agency into “national public service institutions” and to “review the status of all the government newspapers and allow as many of them as possible to become independent commercial entities”.

The ministerial policy declaration recognised the importance of competition within the media and accepted that the media’s role should go far beyond entertainment, specifically citing education as what it called an “essential component in our national radio and television programming”۲۸/ The media’s role to make the government “transparent and accountable” to the public and of “generating national debate on the crucial decisions which we will have to make in the rebuilding of our country in the years ahead” was recognised.

In September 2002 a seminar on “promoting independent and pluralistic media in Afghanistan” took place in Kabul. Representatives of major international media organisations such as UNESCO, the BBC and the Baltic Media Centre, and media NGOs represented in Kabul including Internews, Aïna and IWPR, joined representatives of the Ministry of Information and Culture in giving support to the ministry’s policy declaration in particular “its recognition of freedom of expression as a fundamental human right and an essential part of the free, modern nation Afghanistan aspires to build”. The conference declaration endorsed the ministry’s commitment to transform RTA into a public service corporation and recommended that the international community “assist in providing financial support to enable national transmissions”. It supported the plan that Bakhtar become a public body independent of government and able to compete with privately owned news agencies. The declaration also urged the international community to support the development of what it called “free media”.

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is said to have among the freest media laws in the South Asia region, made possible by conscious efforts for establishing democratic frameworks following the U.S.-led overthrow of the Taliban regime in late 2001. The country’s Constitution, ratified in 2004, endorses press freedoms, stating that “every Afghan has the right to print or publish topics without prior submission to the state authorities in accordance with the law.”۲۹ Media entrepreneurs and organizations with the goal to support media development took advantage of the openness and a number of new independent media outlets were set up supported largely through foreign aid.

In 2001, there was only one radio broadcaster, Radio Shariat30 run by Radio Television Afghanistan (RTA), the national television and radio authority. In early 2007 there were at least seven private television networks31 and more than 50 independent radio stations. Today there are more than a dozen private TV channels and the number of radios has also increased. In number terms, there are several hundred magazines and newspapers registered at the Ministry of Information and Culture, but only a small fraction of them publish regularly. Historically, the Afghan press has always been the domain of the state. The few private newspapers allowed by some regimes were frequently censored by the authorities. There was no private broadcaster in Afghanistan before 2001.

The government issued a detailed media law in December 2005. It comes with a series of guidelines and establishes five independent media commissions, including a Media Complaints and Violations Handling Commission tasked with reviewing complaints, addressing violations and recommending actions against media to state authorities. The commission is still active but state authorities often bypass it and take unilateral legal actions. The media law also created an Independent Commission for Radio Television Afghanistan, but this commission has been more or less dormant.

Alongside many provisions that support a free media, the law prohibits publication of “matters contrary to the principles of Islam and offensive to other religions and sects.” The language used is too broad and exposes the media to attacks as was evidenced in 2005 when Mohaqiq Nasab, editor of a magazine was jailed on charges of blasphemy. Nasab was sentenced to two years in jail but was released under international pressure. Many journalists have been arrested or detained by prosecutors without a review or recommendation of the media commission. The media law also makes no distinction between community and commercial radios. This means that the government charges the same license fees to both commercial ventures and stations seeking to serve the community as nonprofit organizations.

The media law, issued in the form of a presidential decree in December 2005, was reviewed by the Lower House of Parliament in March and April of this year. It is now awaiting approval by the Upper House of Parliament before being sent to the President for signature at which point it will become law. The media law was drafted by a commission of eminent persons drawn from government, international donors and Afghan and international media representatives. The media law has been widely discussed by the media. The largely conservative legislature has publicly differed with independent broadcasters over coverage of parliament, the entertainment programming (including music videos and films) and has been trying to introduce ways to control content. The Afghan parliament recently passed the draft media law, for the first time recognising Radio Television Afghanistan as a public service broadcaster. The general fear that the media law would be made restrictive still holds as the media law passed by parliament retained many of the restrictive clauses. This is a major impediment in the Afghan process.

The media law was also hotly debated at the Media is Development: Afghanistan Media and Civil Society Forum, held in Kabul on 28-29 March 2007. Many speakers in that conference expressed concerns on the proposed amendments. The general fear among media advocates was that the changes parliament was considering would limit the media’s editorial independence and freedoms. Government and parliament members at the meeting either tried to defend their plans or tried to reassure media leaders saying that both government and parliament would uphold media freedoms. Haji Mohammad Mohaqiq, MP and chairman of the Culture, Media and Religious Affairs committee of the lower house of parliament, though assured the conference that ‘‘there was no threat to the press or an intention to censor the media’’ but named three limitations on the press: ‘‘according to the Constitution the media must not publish or broadcast material that is against Islam, material that slanders individuals, ethnic groups, tribes and others and the media must not undermine the democratic order’’. Such rhetoric clearly exposes attempts by the government and a compliant parliament to exert control over the media. As an initial step, legal reform efforts should seek to cancel provisions requiring print media to obtain licenses, and libel and slander should be decriminalised.

Independent Media Under Attack

At a time of growing instability and lawlessness, threats against the media is a growing concern. Afghan reporters work under intense pressure owing to intimidation and harassment from a range of actors including security forces, politicians, government officials, local strongmen, Taliban groups and others. According to the Association of Afghan Journalists, in 2005 two journalists were killed and there were 45 registered cases of intimidation and actions against journalists. The number of registered cases of intimidation rose to over 50 in 2006, which is also an underestimate of the threat because a majority of cases go unreported. In 2007 two media workers were killed32 and several more were threatened as a result of Taliban violence and actions by foreign military forces. The attacks have been widely condemned while greater international moral support and diplomatic pressure on the government and other anti-media actors is being urged.

The media in Afghanistan has remained caught in the crossfire between the Taliban and the government/ NATO/ US-led forces. The Taliban accuse journalists of working for the government while the government has issued orders barring journalists from interviewing opposition commanders or portraying Afghan security forces in “a negative light”.۳۳ The information and culture minister has even ordered editors to refer to slain police officers and soldiers as “martyrs.”۳۴A general lack of awareness about the media’s role and rights has led to suspicion and harassment of journalists. American and NATO-led forces have also controlled access of media to the battle zones and prevented reporting by Afghan reporters. In one example, the U.S. army confiscated cameras from journalists following a suicide attack in the eastern city of Jalalabad, where 10 Afghan bystanders were killed in a subsequent shootout.

Generally, media in the provinces face greater insecurity and difficulties in information gathering compared to their counterparts in Kabul. Journalists have formed several unions and Afghanistan has at least two media watchdog groups but the country lacks formal structures for protecting and defending journalists. The insecurity of journalists – both real and perceived – has resulted in self-censorship. Still the media have continuously tackled controversial political and social issues and would be able to perform better through training on specialized reporting. Donor support after 2002 helped to provide Afghan journalists – who largely represent a younger generation – basic training on journalism skills. They now require training on specialized techniques such as investigative reporting and specializations for covering – among others – politics, economics, the environment, corruption, governance and human rights.

Media Capacity

Despite a few success stories, overall media capacity remains weak in the country. More training and capacity-building is needed, especially in the areas of business development/marketing, management training and beat-specific journalism, including investigative journalism and economic reporting. The general opinion is that while content quality has improved, there is room for improvement and professionalism – and informed and improved media content can help ease the transition.

Media Coverage

In 2006, the The Killid Group and Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung conducted a survey on media coverage, the reach and the main sources of information.

According to the study:
• The continuing war attracted the highest coverage (17.36%), human rights (10.7%) and reconstruction (9.50%), though the latter increases to 15.42% if combined with the economy (5.92%), which was considered as a separate category.
• Reports on people’s needs and claims followed reconstruction (8.20%), followed by politics (7.96%) and social behaviors (6.96%).
• The other thematic areas included in the survey comprised of less than five percent of overall coverage, even though narcotics accounted for 4.93 percent of the stories covered. Corruption accounted for 4.8 percent, international aid 4.61 percent, environment 2.7 percent and accountability of government institutions, just 0.82 percent of coverage.
• Three aspects were considered while looking at reports on human rights: Human rights in general (4.33%), women’s rights (4.30) and democratic rights (2.07%).
• The sources of the information were overwhelmingly government; almost 40 percent of published information was attributed to government sources – central government (26.92%) and local governments (12.84%). However, coverage rose to 52.60 percent when intergovernmental organizations (10.65%) and foreign governments (2.19%) were grouped together.
• Other sources of information were: Individuals (8.53%), the civil society (8.23%), other institutions (7.80%) and local actors (5.46).
• International news agencies accounted for 16.76 percent of the coverage in the Afghan media. This figure was explained by the use by media of services provided by the state-run Bakhtar Information Agency’s (BIA) international service. (The BIA relies extensively – ۸۵% – on translating foreign agency copy.) When the BIA was excluded, international news agencies accounted for 10.23 percent of the coverage.
• The media included in the study used content from Afghan news agencies – ۲۴/۷۶% of information published or broadcast. Most information was provided by the Pajhwok Afghan News and the BIA, the latter almost exclusively in the case of the government media.

Media Sustainability

Apart from threats and intimidation of journalists, doing journalism in Afghanistan is constrained by the imperfect market for advertising and the general lack of an advertising culture. The still recovering economy does not have enough products that require advertising making it impossible for media to survive solely on advertising revenues. Direct donor funding to the media has also been drastically reduced. As an alternative, some media organizations have turned to political parties or individuals– including former warlords – for funding, which could cause media to compromise their integrity. The trend applies to both the print and broadcast media. Many of the provinces still lack independent media for a variety of reasons, including the ongoing military battles and a lack of donor or private sector support. The provinces without local media are Uruzgan and Zabul in the south, Nimroz and Farah in the west, Sar-e Pul and Jowzjan in the north and Kunar, Laghman and Nuristan in the east.
CONCLUSION

Despite the regularity of ‘‘bad’’ news coming out of Afghanistan, the country’s media development success is a beacon of hope, not only for Afghans but also for others who are confronting similar challenges in other parts of the world. The effort also clearly expresses the resolve of Afghans to build a better future for themselves and their children and to live in peace and harmony with the rest of the world. It is a cause worth supporting.

Local leadership and ownership are two very important principles to keep in mind when outsiders attempt to help countries emerging from conflict to re-build the foundation for a peaceful and democratic society. Whether it is in the field of security, governance, development or poverty eradication local knowledge, resolve and leadership and ownership can not be easily replaced by outsiders. Outsiders are first and foremost limited by the fact of their origin: they have limited knowledge of the realities on the ground and they come in at a certain point of time and are bound to depart sooner or later. The commitment is transitory. They can not and should not be on the ground, ‘‘doing it’’ for the locals. It is simply impossible to sustain for any reasonable period of time any project that hinges upon foreign expertise and finances without the input and ownership of the locals. That burden must be carried by the local leadership with the clear sense of ownership and responsibility, no matter how ill equipped the may be and not withstanding the difficulty on the part of the outside intervening force to work with the local leadership. Without these two elements of engagement, no matter how well intentioned outside policy and action might be, the chances of eventual success is minimal. There is simply no alternative to them.

This fact can easily be explained by comparing the experience of media development in Iraq with that of Afghanistan. Notwithstanding the 7-fold35 additional resources committed to the effort, the Iraqi experience produced far fewer results than what has been achieved by a much smaller investment in Afghanistan. The media development work in Iraq was conceived and lead in a heavy-handed manner by the US Department of Defence, focusing exclusively on reforming a moribund and dormant state-run media with little local involvement or ownership of the process. It is not surprising that there are far fewer results to show for.

In contrast, the Afghan experience clearly demonstrate the good sense and effectiveness of policies that take local conditions, needs, constraints, capacity, resources and above all local vision into consideration. The decision to invest in private and independent media instead of only focusing on efforts to reform the out-dated, old-fashioned and highly bureaucratic state broadcaster controlled by a government that believes more in controlling content than allowing for free expression and protecting the media, on hindsight, can be said to be the right policy decision.

However, this is not to say mistakes have not been made. The decision to only fund media outlets for a short period, around the time of the major political processes (Loya Jirgas and elections) and then to cut funding, without taking the condition on the ground into consideration, is likely to undo all the good of the past few years. This policy currently in practice is not at all viable and carries unacceptable risks for Afghan media and the democratic and development process that is underway. It is simply unacceptable to let the hard work of the Afghans and the substantial investment of the international community in Afghanistan’s media be risked by a financial decision. The political cost of such a decision is too high. If we are really serious about the rhetoric of eradicating poverty, sustainable development, good governance, transparency and accountability, then efforts to support media development and civil society in Afghanistan must continue for the next 5-10 years.

The Afghan media remains as the last line of defence of public interest in a country that is still dominated by factionalism and violence. More so in a situation where civil society still remains confined to the capital and other cities that are deemed to be “safe”. Continued investment in the media is investment for peace and the growth of civil society.